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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is a comparative analysis of China’s influence in Djibouti and Panama. 
Specifically, this thesis asks what economic, political, and security factors contributed to 
the establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, whether these 
factors are found in Panama, and, if so, what explains the absence of a Chinese military 
base, or simply security cooperation, in Panama to date. Djibouti and Panama are both 
positioned at strategic waterways—the Bab al Mandeb and Panama Canal, respectively. 
China has economic interests in both Africa and Latin America and has stated it will 
extend its military to protect these interests. This thesis found that China has economic 
interests and influence in both Djibouti and Panama, but Panama does not have 
well-established political or security relations with China, as Djibouti does. China opened 
diplomatic relations with Djibouti in 1979, but China only opened diplomatic relations 
with Panama in 2017. Moreover, China does not have an apparent military relationship 
with Panama, while Panama’s Public Force has worked with the United States in bilateral 
security interests revolving around the Panama Canal. This may explain why China has 
not yet established a military relationship with Panama. Nonetheless, China’s rapidly 
growing economic influence in Panama may weaken U.S. economic, political, and 
security influence in Latin America. 
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I. PROTECTING CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: 
BASE EXPANSION TO LATIN AMERICA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
China has been rapidly expanding its maritime presence, not only in the South 
China Sea but also further east into the Pacific and west to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). 
China’s maritime expansion revolves around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also 
known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), Xi Jinping’s economic and foreign policy plan 
announced in 2013 to integrate land and maritime trade networks, or the Maritime Silk 
Road (MSR), to bring Chinese goods to global markets.1 In addition to the ambitious BRI, 
the 2015 Chinese military strategy recognizes the importance of the maritime domain and 
asserts that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will protect China’s territory, sovereignty, 
and interests.2   
Within this foreign policy context, China has used Africa since 1996 to extract 
natural resources while also building schools, hospitals, and transportation networks in an 
effort to further develop poor African countries.3 Most notably, Djibouti is a focal point 
for China in extracting resources and connecting global trade through the Bab al Mandeb 
(BAM), the strategic waterway connecting the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean.4 
While China and Djibouti have mutually deepened their civil and military rapport since 
establishing a diplomatic relationship in 1979, China’s interest in Djibouti has grown in 
 
1 The BRI is a global economic and foreign policy measure enacted by President Xi Jinping to expand 
China’s economic reach. The BRI is developed around infrastructure and investment projects across the 
globe that give China economic and political influence and open up markets for Chinese goods. For more 
information on the BRI, see: Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One 
Road’ Initiative,” China Leadership Monitor 47, no. 2 (2015): 3. 
2 “China’s Military Strategy White Papers,” Air University, 6, accessed April 5, 2019, 
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/1353697/chinas-military-strategy-white-papers/. 
3 Chris Alden, China in Africa (Chicago, IL: Zed Books, 2007), 3–4, https://www.press.uchicago.edu/
ucp/books/book/distributed/C/bo20848157.html. 
4 Raphael ZiroMwatela and Zhao Changfeng, “Africa in China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: A 
Critical Analysis,” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 21, no. 12 (December 2016): 10, 12. 
2 
recent years.5 That increased interest is because as China has invested in several large-
scale infrastructure projects in Djibouti, beginning with the announcement of its first 
overseas military base in 2015, which marked a central move away from its historical 
foreign policy not to establish foreign military bases.6 Additionally, China presently 
supports counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa from its base in Djibouti; these 
operations are aimed at protecting trade going through the strategic BAM chokepoint and 
Horn of Africa and at allowing China to act as a global maritime power. When it comes to 
trade, China has recognized the importance of the BAM and protecting sea lines of 
communication as its economic interests expand, which explains China’s political and 
military influence in the middle east region.7 
China is now trying to replicate its African strategy by developing economic and 
political relationships in the Western Hemisphere.8 As part of its efforts, China is focusing 
on boosting geopolitical and economic relationships with developing states to enhance 
cooperation and better exert “hard” and “soft” power.9 Xi Jinping ambitiously sought to 
trade $500 billion with Latin America (LATAM) from 2015–2019, including direct 
investment of $250 billion.10 Specifically, China has historic interest in the strategic 
Panama Canal. China’s investment in operating at the Panama Canal dates back to 1997, 
when it signed leases to operate ports at the north end of the canal (Cristobal) and on the 
southern end (Balboa).11 Additionally, China more recently started an estimated $1 billion 
 
5 Mike Chia-Yu Huang, “A New Game Started? China’s ‘Overseas Strategic Pivots’ in the Indian 
Ocean Region,” China Report 54, no. 3 (August 1, 2018): 278, https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445518779164. 
6 Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick deGategno, “China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: 
The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base” (Center for Naval Analyses 
Arlington United States, July 1, 2017), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1038215. 
7 Geoffrey F. Gresh, “A Vital Maritime Pinch Point: China, the Bab al-Mandeb, and the Middle East,” 
Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 38, https://doi.org/10.1080/
25765949.2017.12023324. 
8 Lei Yu, “China’s Strategic Partnership with Latin America: A Fulcrum in China’s Rise,” 
International Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1049, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12397. 
9 Yu, 1048, 1067–68. 
10 David Dollar, China’s Investment in Latin America (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2017), 1, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-investment-in-latin-america/. 
11 Katherine Koleski, Backgrounder China in Latin America (Washington, DC: US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 2011), 25. 
3 
dollar project at the megaport facility at Margarita Island, just north of the Panama Canal, 
renaming it the Panama Colón Container Port (PCCP).12 China has justified its military 
presence in Djibouti by supporting counter-piracy missions, which align with its “far seas 
protection” efforts to secure maritime trade and economic interests.13 Similarly, as China 
increases its economic and political footprint in LATAM, it may expand its military to 
protect economic trade routes like those in Africa, an effort that aligns with the objective 
in its 2015 military strategy to “safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests.”14  
Additionally, China offers LATAM an economic and security alternative to the 
United States. China’s increase in trade with LATAM since the early 2000s contests 
longstanding U.S. hegemony and presence in the region and weakens U.S. security and 
influence in LATAM.15 Panama dropped its recognition of Taiwan and opened a 
diplomatic relationship with China in June 2017, which resulted in trade talks between 
China and Panama in 2018.16 Similarly, from 2007–2017, Ecuador reduced its ties to and 
economic dependence on the United States while strengthening its trade ties with China.17 
The possibility of more substantial Chinese political, economic, and military influence in 
the region has the potential to affect U.S. relationships with LATAM countries and gives 
credence to China as a “world power” in the new era of great power competition. LATAM 
is another continent from which China can extract natural resources, develop economic 
relationships with new nations, and, as it has done in Africa, deploy the military to protect 
its trade.  
Given these developments, this thesis asks the following question: To what extent 
are the economic, political, and military factors seen in the buildup of China’s first overseas 
 
12 Koleski, 25. 
13 Jeff Becker, “What Does China Want in Djibouti?,” The National Interest, December 27, 2017, 
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-china-want-djibouti-23827. 
14 Air University, “China’s Military Strategy White Papers,” 6. 
15  Daniel Morgan, “Expanding the Rebalance: Confronting China in Latin America,” Parameters 45, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 107, 109. 
16 Koleski, Backgrounder China in Latin America, 25. 
17 Koleski, 27. 
4 
military base in Djibouti similar to the economic, political, and military factors seen in its 
involvement in Panama? If they are similar, what, then, explains the absence of Chinese 
military bases in Panama so far? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States indicates in the 2018 National Defense Strategy that the 
international order is changing due to strategic competition from several states that affects 
U.S. national security—namely, threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.18 
China as a competitor is not only using predatory economic practices but also undergoing 
a military modernization.19 According to General James Mattis, China wants to pursue its 
military modernization to become a regional hegemon in the Indo-Pacific in order to 
displace the United States.20 Additionally, China is strengthening political and economic 
relationships with LATAM via trade and encouraging countries to break diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan in favor of China.21 Arguably, China desires global supremacy.22 
Identifying political, economic, and military focal points that China uses when determining 
its foreign relations may help direct U.S. policy toward fragile states that are likely to 
welcome Chinese economic investment or political and military influence. The 2018 U.S. 
National Defense Strategy clearly states that if the United States does not meet its defense 
objectives, it will lose global influence, partnerships will suffer, and its ability to access 
markets may decrease.23 Partnerships are critical to success in the era of great power 
competition and global influence. Strengthening partnerships with allies and others alike 
allows the United States to use complementary resources and capabilities to deter its 
aggressors and maintain stability to support economic growth.24  
 
18 Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
19 Department of Defense, 2. 
20 Department of Defense, 2. 
21 Koleski, Backgrounder China in Latin America, 17. 
22 Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2. 
23 Department of Defense, 1. 
24 Department of Defense, 8. 
5 
Identifying what China has done in Djibouti, along with Chinese military strategy 
and BRI projections, can thus provide clarity as to what similar actions China may take in 
Panama, and even LATAM. Answering the research question will add to the literature on 
China’s growing economic influence and provide a blueprint of what China may be looking 
for when establishing overseas military bases. Identifying China’s criteria for establishing 
new bases may give the United States a tool with which to identify countries potentially 
susceptible to Chinese influence and allow the United States to proactively strengthen those 
relationships.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
China’s engagement with other countries occurs on a global scale, yet in regard to 
the BRI, China continues to focus on Africa, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and Latin 
America (LATAM). This literature review provides an overview of the scholarly debates 
on Chinese engagement in Africa and LATAM. Analyses of China’s engagement with the 
African continent describe China as a development partner, an economic competitor, and 
a colonizer.25 As it does in the cases of Africa and the IOR, the literature on Chinese 
engagement in LATAM also points to complex economic, political, and expansionist 
views.  
1. China’s Desire to Develop Economic Partnerships  
One corpus of literature indicates that China’s strategy with respect to the African 
continent involves a desire to develop lasting partnerships and share its developmental 
expertise.26 After all, as Cai notes, the BRI is China’s greatest economic design.27 Alden 
emphasizes that China is an economic partner with Africa and that both desire mutual 
economic success. Likewise, Davies et al. argue that China is investing in infrastructure 
and agricultural development across the African continent and is “uplifting the lives of a 
substantial portion of its people” but qualify that assertion by saying that China is likely 
 
25 Alden, China in Africa, 2007, 5-7. 
26 Alden, 126. 
27 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Lowly Institute, accessed March 2, 
2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative. 
6 
strategically investing in resource-rich countries like Angola and Zambia, as well as 
politically strategic countries like South Africa and Ethiopia.28 Brautigam agrees with 
Alden and Davies et al. that China is acting as Africa’s partner. Through extensive research 
and fieldwork, Brautigam discounts claims of Chinese land acquisitions and Chinese 
peasants settling in Africa to support cheap labor.29 Additionally, she claims that Africa 
openly seeks and accepts partners who will aid in development and that Africa is aware of 
any implications associated with Chinese investment, highlighted by Zhu in a review of 
Brautigam’s book.30 In sum, there is agreement among some scholars that China is acting 
in the best interests of countries with whom it is developing economic relationships.  
The debate in the literature on Chinese engagement in LATAM is similar to that 
surrounding Africa. On the one hand, China desires a mutually beneficial relationship with 
its partners. Lei argues that China prioritizes its relationships with developing states and 
desires mutual advances, caveated by the assumption that China is not threatening to those 
states, “but an opportunity to gain wealth and prosperity.”31 Dominguez echoes Lei’s view 
about China’s economic partnership in LATAM, arguing that China’s domestic rise, along 
with growth in Chinese investment and trade, left lasting impressions on LATAM 
economies and enabled them to better cope with the global economic crisis of 2008.32 In 
a comprehensive literature review, Phillips presents China as complementary to the United 
States and LATAM. She highlights that the Chinese markets have a dependency on U.S. 
prosperity, indicating China is not in the hemisphere to “take on” the United States; instead, 
China values the global economy, including LATAM and the United States.33 At the same 
 
28 Martyn Davies et al., “How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa,” Stellenbosch: 
Centre for Chinese Studies 68 (2008): 11. 
29 Deborah Brautigam, Will Africa Feed China? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=4083511. 
30 Zhiqun Zhu, “Will Africa Feed China?,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 21, no. 4 (December 
2016): 519–20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11366-016-9447-6. 
31 Yu, “China’s Strategic Partnership with Latin America.” 
32 Jorge I. Dominguez, “A View from Latin America,” Foreign Policy, August 2003. 
33 Nicola Phillips, “Re-Ordering the Region? China, Latin America and the Western Hemisphere,” 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, April 15, 2011, 89–99, 94, https://doi.org/
10.18352/erlacs.9252. 
7 
time, Lei points out that the United States still has deep political, economic, and cultural 
influence in LATAM, making it the most important actor in the region.34  
On the other hand, whereas many scholars see China as a mutually beneficial 
partner, others view China as an economic competitor as well. Taking a stake in both sides 
of the argument, Jenkins asserts there are both “complementary” and “competitive” aspects 
to the Chinese economic relationship with LATAM; the relationship is complementary 
because of the natural resource export market, yet is competitive because Chinese goods 
are more competitive compared to LATAM goods for U.S. and EU markets, including the 
technology, electronics, and automobile sectors.35 Similarly, Gallagher and Porzecanski 
add that Chinese manufacturing is outperforming its LATAM counterparts in regional and 
world markets with high-tech exports, which could affect LATAM’s economic growth.36 
Additionally, China’s global economic rise and model for growth could be what LATAM 
countries need, indicating that the Washington Consensus is not the right model for 
economic growth in LATAM.37 Ellis is more critical and notes that the Sino-LATAM 
relationship is based on comparative advantage where world markets are changing, and 
that profits from the LATAM “primary-product export boom” are flowing outward to 
private investors instead of being invested in the domestic economy and people.38 
2. China as an Economic Competitor 
A separate body of literature presents China as an economic competitor 
concentrated on its self-interest and on obtaining resources without concerns for human 
rights, environmental issues, or other host country concerns.39 While maintaining that 
 
34 Yu, “China’s Strategic Partnership with Latin America,” 1065. 
35 Phillips, “Re-Ordering the Region?,” 91–92. 
36 Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin 
American Industrialization (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 1, 64, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=618844. 
37 Gallagher and Porzecanski, 1–2. 
38 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 287–88. 
39 Alden, China in Africa, 2007, 5–6. 
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China is interested in resources in Africa, Alden notes that the reason Africa has embraced 
China as an economic and development partner needs further research and investigation.40 
Cai concurs that China is economically tying itself to BRI countries with intentions to 
advance Chinese manufacturing and lay a foundation for Chinese goods within host 
countries.41 In opposition to Brautigan, Okeowo says China is extracting natural resources 
from Africa while using Chinese companies and labor “without transferring skills and 
technology.”42 Alden notes that Chinese firms have recognized their poor environmental 
practices in Africa and have sought to work more transparently.43 
There are opposing views to the claim that China is an economic competitor in 
Africa. Despite identifying both beneficial and negative aspects to Sino-African relations, 
Alden disagrees with the notion that China is a competitor in Africa, highlighting the fact 
that China is a leader in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the continent.44 Krupakar veers 
from that argument and asserts that although China’s economic assurances are a priority, 
China desires to shape the geopolitics in the IOR and become a “major security player” in 
the long term.45  
LATAM scholars also argue that China has alternative motives in the Western 
Hemisphere, seeking to gain an economic and political advantage in the region. Presenting 
a common view in the literature, Ellis argues that Chinese intervention in LATAM affairs 
aims to isolate Taiwan, access natural resources throughout the region, and establish 
markets and networks for Chinese products.46 There is a unique relationship in the Western 
Hemisphere involving the United States, China, and LATAM. LATAM has readily 
 
40 Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (October 1, 2005): 147, https://doi.org/10.1080/
00396330500248086. 
41 Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 
42 Alexis Okeowo, “China in Africa: The New Imperialists?,” New Yorker, June 12, 2013. 
43 Alden, China in Africa, 2007, 121. 
44 Alden, 127. 
45 Jayanna Krupakar, “China’s Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand 
Strategy?,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 3 (May 4, 2017): 207–22, 218, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09700161.2017.1296622. 
46 Phillips, “Re-Ordering the Region?,” 94. 
9 
accepted many offers from China, which is subtly challenging the U.S. in the region.47 
Phillips sees Ellis’ argument as a possible overstatement of China’s economic 
competitiveness, but agrees that China desires a multipolar world order instead of the U.S.- 
dominated one.48 Additionally, Phillips notes that China has been surreptitiously and 
aggressively using a strategy of “economic diplomacy” to dissuade LATAM countries 
from becoming closer with Taiwan.49 Koleski proposes a similar idea, indicating China is 
using “checkbook diplomacy” to oust Taiwan as a competitor in LATAM by offering aid, 
mil-to-mil relationships, and economic boosts while also focusing on resource-rich 
countries.50 Morgan offers a similar argument, asserting that China challenges U.S. 
political, economic, and military interests in both Asia and the Western Hemisphere and 
calls on the United States to incorporate a plan that covers both regions of interest.51 Jiang 
Shixue disagrees, arguing that China is not interested in geopolitical factors in LATAM, 
but rather possesses a shared interest in economic liberalization.52 Adding to Jiang Shixue, 
another Chinese view, from Xiang Lanxin, maintains that China has not yet characterized 
its role in LATAM affairs, although the United States perceives China’s actions as 
geopolitical.53 Thus, the consensus in this literature is that China is disrupting the labor and 
technology sectors and creating competition in U.S. markets in LATAM.54 
 
47 Dominguez, “A View from Latin America.” 
48 Phillips, “Re-Ordering the Region?,” 94. 
49 Phillips, 94. 
50 Katherine Koleski, Backgrounder China in Latin America (Washington, DC: US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 2011), 16. 
51 Morgan, “Expanding the Rebalance,” 103–14. 
52 Jiang Shixue, “The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective,” in China’s Expansion into the Western 
Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States, ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 40. 
53 Xiang Lanxin, “An Alternative Chinese View,” in China’s Expansion into the Western 
Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States, ed. Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 45, 57. 
54 Phillips, “Re-Ordering the Region?,” 91. 
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3. China’s Military Expansion 
A different group of scholars argues that military factors are more decisive 
regarding China’s activities in Africa. Indeed, Kieven points out that China’s interests 
expand beyond economic ones, suggesting there is a “strong military dimension” as well.55 
Saunders also veers from the economic discussion and highlights the importance of 
military diplomacy in U.S. partnerships. He goes on to say that China does not specifically 
cite partnerships as a goal, but that trends in Chinese military aid enhance political, 
economic, and military relations.56 Alden, too, notes that China’s geopolitical strategy 
aims to develop partnerships with African elites to displace western influence and to gain 
political control in Africa.57 In this connection, Cai highlights that China’s BRI is an 
attempt to gain leverage against its peers in Asia and the international community.58 Along 
those same lines of gaining political influence, many Sinologists—in Kieven’s view—
debate whether the $140 billion BRI plan is a shadow for China to quietly extend its 
military abroad.59 On the same note, Saunders points out that China is emphasizing 
military diplomacy to support its foreign policy by developing partnerships, generating soft 
power, and shaping the security environment.60 Alden contends that despite the problems 
the Chinese may bring to a country, China is still appealing because investment comes 
without the “conditionalities” that U.S. investments come with, such as supporting 
democracy or compliance with human rights regulations.61 Importantly, Alden also notes 
that China’s waving of conditions attached to aid also depends on the host country’s 
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diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.62 Some fear that China is imperialistic and acting out 
of self-interest by offering predatory loans to countries that cannot pay them back, or “debt-
trap diplomacy,” with the intention of re-appropriating ports or territory once a country 
defaults on its loan, as it did with the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and in Djibouti.63 The 
U.S. National Defense Strategy highlights China’s use of “predatory economics to coerce 
neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.”64 Brewster 
points to concerns over China’s “equity-for-debt swap” of the Hambantota Port in Sri 
Lanka in 2017, which would be ideal as a converted naval base.65 Adding to the debt-trap 
diplomacy theory, the Center for Global Development concluded that eight BRI countries 
were at risk of debt distress or debt sustainability, including Djibouti, Pakistan, and the 
Maldives.66 Roett and Paz add that China is establishing “condition free” diplomatic ties 
with countries in exchange for humanitarian aid, soft power, and FDI with unsound 
business practices, while also undermining human rights and democracy.67 According to 
this view, predatory lending appears to be part of China’s strategy to further promote and 
extend its BRI interests, followed by deploying its military to protect its interests. 
Some scholars argue that the maritime dimension is cardinal for China to protect 
its economic interests. For example, Krupakar points to three components to China’s 
maritime strategy: maneuver the PLA Navy (PLAN) to reinforce maritime trade routes and 
economic interests, advance its operational capacity to enable a permanent overseas 
presence, and deter the threat of the U.S. Navy in the maritime domain by increasing the 
 
62 Alden, 155. 
63 “Is China Waging ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’ Against Its Neighbors?,” China U.S. Focus, accessed 
April 22, 2019, https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/is-china-waging-debt-trap-diplomacy-
against-its-neighbors. 
64 Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2. 
65 David Brewster, “China’s Play for Military Bases in the Eastern Indian Ocean,” Lowly Interpreter, 
accessed May 12, 2019, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/the-interpreter/china-s-play-military-bases-eastern-
indian-ocean. 
66 “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” 
Center For Global Development, 11, accessed February 27, 2019, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/
examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-a-policy-perspective. 
67 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications 
for Latin America and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 2, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=1069046. 
12 
cost of conflict.68 In line with these “historic missions,” Krupakar asserts that China’s 
military is taking a proactive approach to protect external interests and align with partner 
nations with similar interests.69 Brewster contends that China’s base in Djibouti 
“represents a major symbolic and practical step in China's emergence as a global military 
power.”70 Djibouti may be the beginning of a growing Chinese military strategy to expand 
outward. According to Brewster, China is looking at Gwadar, Pakistan for its next overseas 
base along with other “networks” of bases to protect its assets in the region.71 He goes on 
to say that China has underestimated security threats near BRI facilities, so the PLA may 
become a viable option for security despite China’s historic policy of only protecting 
citizens within its borders.72 You Ji argues that China is strategically shifting its military 
strategy to the Indian Ocean to safeguard its economic interests.73 
Similar to the argument for increasing Chinese presence in the region, Huang 
argues that China deviates from the U.S. strategy of global military bases and instead favors 
“overseas strategic pivots” consisting of support facilities and construction initiatives.74 
The overseas strategic pivots are similar to the “string of pearls” theory coined by Booz 
Allen Hamilton, which states China could build on its current commercial facilities and 
relationships to project its military in South Asia and into the IOR.75 Yung finds that 
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China’s current operations do not support the “string of pearls” network since China has 
been primarily operating out of “non-pearl” ports such as Djibouti and Karachi.76 
Additionally, he concluded that Pakistan is a likely location for China’s next overseas base 
because Pakistan and China have similar interests and are trusted partners.77 Jaishankar 
notes China’s insistence to not follow in the footsteps of the United States in projecting its 
military internationally and discounts the string of pearls theory since China is operating 
from Djibouti, which is not a “pearl” candidate.78 Lastly, Yung asserts that China does not 
have a sizable support infrastructure or logistics facility chain to gain military dominance 
in the IOR.79  
Although China’s sole overseas military base is in Djibouti, much of the argument 
around China’s BRI and militarizing the IOR revolves around the power struggle between 
China and India. According to foreign policy expert Dhruva Jaishankar, there are a number 
of plausible interpretations of China’s goals in the IOR. David Brewster argues that 
competition in the IOR will increase between China and India.80 Zhu Li dismisses concerns 
from India and agrees with the Chinese government that the BRI and MSR are 
economically advantageous.81 Jabin Jacob states that the MSR component of the BRI is a 
strategic play for China’s domestic politics.82 Lastly, Ji concurs that the military element 
and approach by China in the IOR is clear; they are extending globally and altering strategy 
and doctrine.83 That view is shared by Indian analyst Srikanth Kondapalli who emphasizes 
Chinese developments in infrastructure and arms deals in the IOR.84 However, despite 
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China’s increased presence in the IOR, many authors agree that India still has the upper 
hand because China lacks necessary logistics, surveillance, and strike capability, which 
constrains its ability to project power.85 
Many scholars posit that Chinese military influence closely aligns with its 
geopolitical self-interest; this is often discussed in the context of China’s growing 
economic influence and interest in the Western Hemisphere. Ellis points out that China’s 
actions of consolidating its economic and military influence in the region make conflicts 
with the United States “no longer unthinkable.”86 Additionally, Ellis contends that the 
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military interactions in LATAM have increased as 
evidenced by the number of senior-level military meetings, mil-to-mil exchanges, and arms 
sales—all to support Chinese national development, build political leverage and 
knowledge in the region, and protect its business interests.87 The same security concerns 
were highlighted by retired four-star General John Kelly, reiterating China’s increased ties 
to U.S. partners through VIP visits, military exchanges and training, and the sale of arms.88 
Ellis goes one step further, highlighting how China is implementing its security goals: 
China is giving political, economic, and military support to countries opposing the United 
States and is securing its economic presence in important sectors close to strategic 
geographic areas to weaken the influence the United States has in the region.89 Morgan 
adds that China’s increased political and economic ties to LATAM are interrupting security 
and U.S. influence in the region.90 Nolte describes the subtle changes in Chinese military 
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sales to LATAM, ranging from basic military clothing to more sophisticated equipment 
including radars and telecommunication systems to countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador.91 The level of Chinese economic and military threat to the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere is still contested, but Ellis dominates the debate: China challenges the 
United States as an economic and military partner as China continues to expand its military 
engagements with LATAM, which creates a security threat to the United States.92  
Contrary to the school of thought that claims China is ready for military expansion 
in the Western Hemisphere, Franz-Stefan argues that despite many improvements in the 
PLA, the massive Chinese military still has many weaknesses and would be unable to 
project power globally.93 Yung concurs, stating that China does not currently have the 
infrastructure in place to support global PLAN major combat operations.94 Furthermore, 
Tokatlian argues that if any military expansion has happened in the Western Hemisphere, 
it is from the U.S., not from China.95 The dynamics in the Western Hemisphere should be 
viewed from multiple angles and different perspectives to take into account the 
complicated U.S.-Sino-LATAM economic and politic dynamic. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review indicates that China’s development and influence in in 
Djibouti and Africa more broadly is parallel to China’s economic expansion, investment, 
and influence in LATAM, including Panama. In a first time move to expand militarily, 
China extended its military to operate out of Djibouti to conduct counter-piracy missions 
to protect its maritime interests from the BRI. Similarly, China is expanding its influence 
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economically and politically in LATAM by increasing trade and infrastructure projects and 
offering aid to countries in return for cutting ties with Taiwan. Via these connections, China 
is gaining more influence in the Western Hemisphere as suggested in the literature review. 
The economic factor from China is the primary driver of the case studies and research since 
that is the basis of the BRI and may play a role in determining where China wants to 
establish its next overseas military base. 
Under these circumstances, I hypothesize that based on Chinese economic 
expansion through the BRI and the establishment of the military base in Djibouti to protect 
its assets, China is continuing to build relationships elsewhere in the world, including Latin 
America in general, and Panama in particular, that will allow it to use or build ports and 
other infrastructure as military or support facilities to protect and expand the BRI 
infrastructure and MSR architecture in order to advance its military and strategic goals. 
Specifically, I posit that China seeks relationships where it sees the potential for substantial 
economic and political ties that will give it placement, access, and influence within the 
country and region. If China has economic interests in the target country or surrounding 
area, it may be more likely to establish a base to protect its economic assets. As China 
develops dependency-based relationships with LATAM countries over time, it will have a 
better chance to harness its influence and become a stronger contender in the era of great 
power competition. As the BRI grows, China may need to utilize its military to protect sea 
routes that lead to the Pacific or vital waterways similar to the BAM, like the Panama 
Canal. The PLA’s mission is to protect China’s interests, so as the BRI expands, China has 
a reason to project its military to provide security for its ports, MSR, and economic interests 
abroad. This thesis aims to reveal whether or not China’s approach in Djibouti is also 
apparent in Panama and even LATAM. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes political, economic, and military trends seen in China’s 
relationship with Djibouti and the establishment of China’s first overseas military base. 
Next, the thesis evaluates the same variables in Panama to see if the trends are the same 
and are compatible with Chinese foreign policy in supporting its global BRI interests. 
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Panama controls the strategic Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic. 
Additionally, Panama cut its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan in favor of China.96 The 
literature widely suggests China is undertaking predatory economics in the Indo-Pacific, 
specifically Djibouti; therefore, this thesis fills the gap in a similar discussion applied to 
the Western Hemisphere.  
First, this thesis explored political factors such as historical diplomatic ties and 
engagements and the country’s relationship with Taiwan and the United States. Next, the 
thesis identified economic factors including trade, amount of Chinese debt the country 
holds, infrastructure projects, and other FDI. Lastly, the thesis identified military indicators 
to identify the amount and effectiveness of senior military-level meetings, training and 
exercises, officer exchanges, arms deals, and port visits. The thesis then analyzed 
similarities and differences between Chinese engagement in Djibouti and Panama.  
Djibouti is the primary case study since it is the only PLAN overseas base. As a 
basis for the project, both primary and secondary sources from the United States, LATAM, 
China, Djibouti, and Panama are used to analyze the many angles of the research question. 
Primary sources include government documents, laws, rules, and regulations. Secondary 
sources such as books, journals, and other scholarly articles supplement the primary 
sources to clearly identify Chinese foreign policy and perspectives from each country. 
Also, the sources include newspapers, think tanks and other reports to capture the rhetoric 
and tone from each country’s perspective. Additionally, the thesis identifies trade deals and 
statistics, publicized infrastructure projects and contracts, arms deals, port calls, mil-to-mil 
engagements, and any domestic crisis the host nation is battling that could affect its 
willingness to work with China. Finally, the thesis focuses on U.S. policy in the region and 
ways to adapt to and counter China’s growing presence and influence. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will utilize a three-pronged thematic approach—political, economic, and 
military—to identify Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America. The second chapter 
examines Chinese presence in Djibouti and determines what led China to establish its only 
foreign military base. The third chapter will look at Chinese political, economic, and 
military factors in Panama and identify similarities and differences with Djibouti. The last 
chapter will conclude with the findings—whether or not factors seen in Djibouti operate in 
the same way as in Panama—followed by policy recommendations that could assist in the 
mitigation of more significant Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere and how to 
ultimately avert the establishment of a Chinese military base or additional Chinese 
influence in the region. 
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II. CASE STUDY OF DJIBOUTI: CHINA’S FIRST OVERSEAS 
MILITARY BASE 
Since the 1990s, China has put forth a great deal of effort to integrate its government 
agencies in developing it policies with to respect to Africa. Agencies involved include the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Finance, the National Development and 
Reform Commission, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank),97 which is a 
leading lender to Africa.98 As China’s global interests and economic footprint in Africa 
increase, its military is expanding to the continent to protect China’s economic Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI).99 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) missions launched from 
Djibouti since 2008 provide security for maritime interests in the region, but China has also 
increased arms sales to Africa to suppress terrorism and increase cooperation with the 
international community.100 China’s economic, political, and military influence in Africa 
is significant. Within this context, Djibouti stands as the location of China’s first overseas 
operational base. As such, China has linked several infrastructure projects and economic 
chains throughout Djibouti to the port facility while simultaneously developing a greater 
military presence within the country and deepening its political influence via diplomatic 
talks and economic leverage. Evidence suggests that China values Djibouti’s location, 
openness to foreign militaries, Chinese-owned and -operated infrastructure, dependence on 
Chinese capital, and support of China over Taiwan.101 As a result, China established its 
first overseas military base in Djibouti.  
China’s base, in the vicinity of the strategic Bab al Mandeb (BAM) strait, was not 
built overnight but was the result of long-term bilateral relations. Djibouti is a primarily 
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urban and poor society with high rates of illiteracy, is 94% Sunni Muslim, and has a 
population of approximately 884,000 as of July 2018.102 Additionally, the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which measures countries’ human development using three 
criteria—health, education, and standard of living—ranked Djibouti 172 out of 189, nearly 
last on the global list comparing human development.103 As such, Djibouti’s 
socioeconomic problems make it open to outside investment and aid, regardless of where 
such assistance is coming from. China has increased trade, humanitarian assistance, and 
military relations with Djibouti over the last 40 years. Bilateral trade hit $1.99 billion in 
2015, a more than 75% increase since 1982; China also provided significant humanitarian 
assistance to the region in the form of food aid in 2011 and assistance to refugees in 
2015.104 During this span, the PLAN steadily increased port calls and now leases its first 
overseas base for approximately $20 million per year, creating a source of revenue for 
Djibouti.105 More recently, Sino-Djiboutian economic, military, and political relations 
have been strengthening simultaneously. China has invested in multiple large- and small-
scale infrastructure projects that boost economic transport and trade in Djibouti, conducts 
counter-piracy operations in the waters surrounding Djibouti to protect trade and enhance 
partnerships, and ingrains itself politically in Djibouti with a hands-off approach to 
domestic politics, unlike the United States, which puts conditionalities on its partners. The 
relationship also makes Djibouti reliant on Chinese investment in order to promote 
economic growth.106 This chapter will analyze how China’s political, economic, and 
military relationships with Djibouti led to the development and August 2017 establishment 
of the Chinese military base.107 
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A. SINO-DJIBOUTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
China and Djibouti have mutually deepened their civil and military rapport since 
establishing a diplomatic relationship in 1979, based on common interests such as 
Djibouti’s recognition of China over Taiwan and economic and military opportunities that 
benefit both countries.108 China’s infrastructure investment process in Djibouti is complex, 
with several tiers to the terms and contracts, but the use of Chinese services and equipment 
remains a constant in infrastructure related projects.109 This benefits China as Chinese 
citizens, supplies, and equipment are utilized for Chinese-brokered deals. China has 
followed a path of establishing special economic zones (SEZ) with favorable investment 
incentives that make China the go-to partner in the region.110 Additionally, Fowler 
indicates that, “Chinese enterprises and state policy banks have financed and built the 
Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway…and expanded the Port of Djibouti,” and Djibouti’s 
Doraleh port was also financed and built by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE).111 
These investment and infrastructure projects create opportunities and employment for 
Chinese civilians while also providing economic growth for Djibouti. 
Within the framework of a broader policy—aimed at investments and infrastructure 
projects to enhance economic compatibility, establish export markets, and create 
employment for Chinese workers—China brokered a deal with Ethiopia and Djibouti in 
2011 for construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, connecting Ethiopia’s 
landlocked exports to the Port of Doraleh in Djibouti.112 The Addis Ababa–Djibouti 
Railway is meant to assist transportation of exports and imports from Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
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and international shipping lanes, in an effort to make Djibouti an African transportation 
hub.113  
China has also displayed goodwill towards Djibouti by financing a potable water 
project between Djibouti and Ethiopia, with construction beginning in 2015, to alleviate 
the drinking water problem in Djibouti.114 The Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline is an 
example of a Chinese loan that does not appear to directly benefit China other than 
strengthening its relations with Djibouti and giving it leverage if Djibouti defaults on the 
loan. The water pipeline can be characterized as an investment in the relationship rather 
than a direct economic investment. The project is meant to solve the drinking water 
problem in Djibouti for around $332 million.115 China Exim bank is reportedly funding 
the majority of the project.116 Historically, Djibouti has been plagued with issues related 
to lack of water, so the project has hopes of alleviating some of that problem.117 China is 
likely seen as an angel investor to Djiboutians since no other investors were available. 
In more recent years, China has been working with Djibouti and Ethiopia to broker 
a deal to export natural gas from Ethiopia to Djibouti, exemplified by the Damerjog Port-
Ogaden Basin pipeline project.118 The Damerjog Port-Ogaden Basin pipeline is a newer 
example of Chinese investment and interests in Djibouti. The project’s roots first emerged 
in the 1970s when Ethiopia found large gas deposits, followed in 2013 by China’s POLY-
GCL Petroleum Investments signing a deal with Ethiopia and beginning work in the 
area.119 China recognized the natural resource opportunity and the possibility of using 
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Djibouti as a connection to extract it. Work on Djibouti’s Damerjog port is in progress, and 
as with the railway, China is the leader in construction, materials, and financing for the 
project.120 The pipeline is a newer project, but likely a part of China’s strategic plans in 
the region to export resources.  
Key findings from a 2017 Center for Naval Analyses report describe the economic 
interests of China’s presence in Djibouti. First, China and Djibouti share economic 
interests, so their relationship has strengthened in the near-term.121 Djibouti’s geographic 
location also offers a competitive advantage compared to other resource-rich countries in 
the region that are landlocked.122 China has invested large amounts of money and 
resources into Djibouti and the remainder of the region, not only to boost its BRI 
infrastructure and access to increase its ability to extract resources, but also to transport the 
resources to waterways from Djibouti.  
Nonetheless, Djibouti is not a leading destination for Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI), trade, or loans. Leading beneficiaries of Chinese FDI even in 2014 were 
Algeria, Zambia, Kenya, Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, and in 2017, Djibouti was not 
even in the top 25 African countries receiving FDI from China.123 Despite complex 
Chinese investment projects in Djibouti, Djibouti is not China’s leading African trade 
partner in either imports or exports: As of 2017, the largest African exporters to China were 
Angola, South Africa, and The Republic of Congo, whereas the largest importers were 
South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt.124 Regarding Chinese loans to Africa from 2000–2017, 
Angola topped the list with $42.8 billion, while Djibouti was not even in the top 15, with 
a total of $14.6 billion over 17 years.125 Moreover, while Djibouti is dependent on Chinese 
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investment to transition from an agrarian economy to a manufacturer-based economy,126 
it may also be at risk of defaulting on Chinese loans.127 
B. SINO-DJIBOUTIAN SECURITY/MILITARY RELATIONS 
As the economic relationship between China and Djibouti has progressed, their 
security and military relationship has also greatly expanded over the last several decades. 
Indeed, China’s economic ties to Africa, in general, and Djibouti in particular, along with 
energy and oil dependency, are encouraging China’s development of strategic partnerships 
in the region in which its military is playing a vital role to the international community by 
assisting in counter-piracy operations to protect the collective region’s economic 
interests.128 Constant counter-piracy missions mean that replenishment of supplies is a 
frequent and necessary operation. As China increased its presence in the Gulf of Aden 
(GOA) in support of counter-piracy operations from 2009–2013, Djibouti was the port call 
of choice, allowing for resupply.129  
China’s military relationship with Djibouti elevated as a result of port visits, 
training, and counter-piracy operations, as well as arms deals and delegations of senior 
personnel. Although relatively limited compared to arms deals with other Chinese partners, 
China delivered Y-12 transport aircraft and WMA-301 fire support vehicles to Djibouti 
between 2013–2015.130 Additionally, China and Djibouti had eight senior-level military 
and diplomatic meetings from 2003–2016.131 Most meetings involved the Chinese 
Defense Minister, Chief of PLA General Staff, and the President of Djibouti.132 China 
recognizes the positive aspects of bilateral relations, and according to the Institute for 
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National Strategic Studies (INSS), those relations are a “high-level buy-in for a broader 
program of military-to-military activities.”133 
In this context, the base at Djibouti acts as a conduit to support resource extraction 
from east African countries and provide the PLAN a hub to complete counter-piracy 
operations to protect the BRI infrastructure and cooperate with the international 
community. The Chinese base in Djibouti appears to be more about strategic location to 
facilitate China’s broader economic relationships throughout eastern Africa rather than a 
specific partnership with Djibouti. 
C. SINO-DJIBOUTIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Chinese assistance to Djibouti comes with a hands-off approach to Djiboutian 
internal affairs, with one caveat: it must follow the “One China” policy—i.e., severing ties 
with Taiwan.134 China has engaged diplomatically with Djibouti far more than with many 
other African states. As defined here and as put forth by the INSS, political and diplomatic 
interactions include senior-level meetings, naval port calls, and military exercises.135 
According to the INSS, Djibouti had the third-highest number of PLA military diplomatic 
interactions among African states between 2003–2016, trailing behind South Africa and 
Egypt.136 The base became operational in 2017 with PLAN vessels conducting routine 
operations at the port facility, so data from after 2016 is not included in this analysis. The 
INSS reported 23 naval port calls and eight senior-level meetings, totaling 31 China-
Djibouti interactions, compared to a total of 32 for South Africa and 38 for Egypt. Port 
calls are particularly important; sources from China suggest “that port calls provide 
opportunities for ‘combined training, mutual understanding, and constructing friendly 
relations.’”137 Senior-level meetings are also important because they give leaders and 
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decision makers a forum to negotiate their strategic objectives. Leaders within the PLA 
suggest that “Senior-level meetings, strategic dialogues, and functional exchanges are often 
used to deliver diplomatic talking points, nontraditional security operations provide public 
goods that enhance China’s international reputation, and military exercises are often 
presented as examples of international cooperation.”138 However, the INSS reported zero 
Sino-Djiboutian military exercises between 2003 and 2016,139 possibly because the 
Djiboutian naval fleet consists of relatively smaller vessels that may not be capable of 
operating with PLAN vessels. 
China has also conducted humanitarian efforts in Djibouti to enhance its image and 
work on bilateral relations. In 2010, the PLAN deployed its hospital ship, also known as 
the “Peace Ark,” to Djibouti to provide free medical services, and again in 2017 to provide 
treatment along with medical training.140 Djibouti was also utilized as a base of operations 
for China to facilitate and conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) from 
Libya in 2011 and from Yemen in 2015.141 
China has portrayed itself as an equal partner in the international community by 
engaging diplomatically while also providing training and aid to countries in the region. 
China favors and recognizes the importance of political relations and uses its military and 
resources to enforce those relationships. China engaged with Djibouti, Egypt, and South 
Africa, all of whom share a strategic position on the African continent. Djibouti sits along 
the BAM, with Egypt at the Suez Canal, and South Africa on the Southern tip of the 
continent, all strategic waterways for global shipping. Where China has an economic 
footprint and a port linking other African countries to strategic waterways for 
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transportation of goods, its political and military footprints follow to ensure security for 
itself and its partners of interest. 
D. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF CHINESE ACTIONS AND INFLUENCE 
IN DJIBOUTI 
Djibouti and China have complementary economic, security, and political interests, 
which have enabled China to establish its first overseas military base in Djibouti. China 
nurtured a long-term and friendly relationship with Djibouti, invested in it economically, 
built infrastructure, and provided security for the region to protect its investments. All in 
all, China’s economic interests appear to be a driver of the extension of its military. 
China seems more concerned with advancing its own economic and strategic 
interests rather than simply investing and assisting Djibouti’s interests. China strategically 
built its relationship with Djibouti, thereby allowing China access to build and operate the 
port facility. However, despite China’s investments in and interactions with Djibouti, 
Djibouti is not a leading economic partner with China, nor does it lead Africa in diplomatic 
and political relationships with China. China’s investments are connecting Djibouti to 
important African states for the purpose of extracting and transporting resources. This 
suggests that China is looking for a strategic location for its next military base, similar to 
a strategic chokepoint like the BAM that has access to a range of maritime traffic and other 
markets and grants China the ability to police the surrounding waters. China’s actions in 
Djibouti suggests that China favors location, Chinese-built and -operated infrastructure, 
dependence on Chinese capital, support of China, and openness to foreign militaries.142 
These developments thus explain the military base in Djibouti and offer a possible criterion 
for future bases. 
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III. CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN PANAMA  
Latin America (LATAM) has been a focal point of increasing Chinese influence 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Senior-level Chinese delegations of 
government officials and businessmen traveled to LATAM in the early 2000s to discuss 
the region’s economy, politics, and security issues.143 Broadly speaking, at that time, 
China used its economic boom to extend and develop relationships and markets in LATAM 
while also boosting LATAM’s economic growth; China’s need for commodities opened 
up export markets for LATAM countries.144 Looking past the turn of the century, China 
increased its trade and influence in LATAM in the last decade as well, continuing the 
upward trend of trade and economic influence. Indeed, according to The Brookings 
Institution, trade between Latin America and China increased nearly 30 times during this 
period, from $10 billion in 2000 to $270 billion in 2012.145 In 2018, China publicly 
announced that it wants Latin America to be involved in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
initiative, and LATAM appears to have welcomed it.146 China has also looked to extend 
its military to the region, although the PLA is much less involved in LATAM than in Asia 
and Africa. The PLA’s efforts in LATAM have focused on humanitarian assistance. 
Examples of China’s military presence in the region include China’s hospital ship “Peace 
Ark,” which has visited several Latin American countries since 2011 to provide medical 
services to locals, military, and administrative personnel; visits included Peru in 2015, as 
a part of humanitarian assistance to the people and region; it also ported near Venezuela’s 
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capital in response to the oil giant’s worsening economic and humanitarian crisis.147 
Diplomatically, in addition to strengthening bilateral relations, China is also inserting itself 
into global and regional bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Organization of American States (OAS), International Development Bank (IDB), 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).148 Overall, China’s 
presence and influence in the LATAM region is apparent and does not appear to be 
decreasing in the immediate future as the BRI continues its expansion.  
China has recently emphasized relations with Panama, as the Panama Canal is an 
economic hub and strategic waterway for global trade. Inequality in Panama is very high, 
but it also has one of the fastest-growing economies in LATAM, with a population of 
approximately 3.8 million as of July 2018, 85% of whom are Roman Catholic.149 
Additionally, the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures countries’ human 
development using three criteria—health, education, and standard of living—ranked 
Panama 66 of 189, indicating Panama is near the top third of countries in regards to human 
development.150 China’s influence in Panama is predicated on China’s BRI expansion 
efforts, whereby the Canal enables China to connect and gain access to other markets via 
the Colon Free Trade Zone (FTZ). This chapter will examine the Sino-Panamanian 
economic, military and security, and political relationships to assess whether or not Panama 
fits the parameters of China’s military interests as determined by the analysis of China’s 
relationship with Djibouti in Chapter two. 
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A. SINO-PANAMANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
China and Panama’s economic relationship is being fueled by a long-term 
connection focused on trade in the Panama Canal region. The Panama Canal is a focal point 
of Panama’s history and economy and is a significant part of global trade. The Panama 
Canal, which has linked trade between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans since its opening in 
1914, provides significant income for Panama and is one of the busiest shipping routes in 
the world.151 The Panama Canal could be compared with the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb 
(BAM), the Strait of Hormuz, or the Strait of Malacca—all waterways that are vital to 
global shipping. The canal is ever more critical today, following expansion efforts in 2016 
that enabled bigger ships with more cargo to pass through.152 These expansion efforts 
allow bigger “Panamax-size” ships that accommodate more than double the previous 
capacity, an increase from 5,000 containers to 13,000 containers, to pass through the 
canal.153 
As necessary as the canal is to Panama, it is also crucial to economic players and 
competitors around the globe. As of the end of 2018, the United States and China remain 
the top users of the canal, along with Mexico, Chile, and Japan.154 In 1999, the United 
States handed over operations of the canal back to Panama as the 1977 Torrijos-Carter 
Treaty expired, giving Panama full rights over the strategic waterway.155 In more recent 
years, China and Panama have been rapidly developing closer ties as China is investing in 
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transportation, technology, and communications projects around the country.156 Since 
2000, the list of major infrastructure projects built in Panama by China has included the 
Balboa Port, the Colón Container Terminal (phase III), and the Amador Convention Center, 
while the Martano natural gas power plant, Margarita Island Port, Panama Amado Cruise 
Terminal, and Chiriqui high-speed train are planned to be built at a cost in the billions of 
dollars.157 The two countries are also in the process of negotiating free trade agreements 
to benefit both parties. 
China understands the importance of the Panama Canal and its strategic location in 
the Western Hemisphere, recognizing its benefit to trading and logistics in the region. 
China sees Panama as a logistics hub, and, as noted in Americas Quarterly, it is “the second 
largest-user of the Panama Canal and the main exporter to the Colón Free Trade Zone.”158 
According to research from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
China’s investments in Panama date back to 1997, when China signed leases with Panama 
to operate ports on the north end of the canal (Cristóbal) and the southern end (Balboa).159 
The Commission also described China’s more recent activity in starting the (estimated) $1 
billion project at the mega port facility at Margarita Island, just north of the Panama Canal, 
renaming it the Panama Colón Container Port (PCCP). The Landbridge Group, a private 
Chinese firm, collaborated with China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) to build and 
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operate the port facility.160 The port investment came shortly after the expansion of the 
Panama Canal in 2016 and puts China in a more significant position to influence the canal. 
The mega port project consists of three progressing stages: (1) increase the handling 
volume of the port facility, (2) add four new berths for larger ships, and (3) add a “logistics 
park” to incorporate more equipment and cranes.161 The purpose of stages one and two is 
to allow berthing and storage for the new Panamax-size ships.162 Increased ship sizes mean 
there is a higher capacity for goods, resulting in more trade and influence in the region. 
Panama, like other Latin American countries, has welcomed such FDI in hopes of 
creating a better economy and more prosperous living conditions for its people. Incredibly, 
China has established bilateral investment treaties spanning 12 countries throughout Latin 
American and the Caribbean (LAC), and Panama was the number-one importer of Chinese 
goods in LAC during 2016.163 For several years, China put some effort and resources into 
constructing an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua. A canal in Nicaragua would 
challenge the Panama Canal and give China a great deal of power and influence in the 
region; however, the idea has never come to fruition due to environmental factors and other 
internal hurdles. China’s interest in funding a canal in Nicaragua is another example of 
Chinese engagement in Latin American affairs and shows its interests in establishing a 
foothold at a strategic waterway. However, despite the billions of dollars China has 
invested in LATAM, not one country accounted for in LATAM is a top-10 destination on 
China’s global targeted investment list.164 
China’s FDI can have positive or negative effects depending on the support from 
the host government. Su and Delgado argue that the success of significant investments 
similar to the canal is dependent on the support from the banks and from the host country 
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in dealing with concerns from the local communities who could be affected by the 
construction and new infrastructure of proposed projects.165  In the case of Nicaragua, the 
project did not have full support of the government because of environmental concerns; 
however, they did initially welcome it because their economy needed a boost. The 
investment still has not happened, and Nicaragua still has not experienced a significant 
influx in its economy. China is often willing to invest in weaker economies because it sees 
them as a long-term investment and will still be able to utilize its investments regardless of 
the host country’s economy. A similar argument regarding Chinese investment could 
explain the new port facility at the Panama Canal, but China’s investment would also 
consist of support from the Panamanian government and would generate a positive 
outcome for both players. Although Panama has a strong and growing economy, China’s 
investment in the mega port is likely another step in creating more significant trade 
opportunities with Panama and swaying western influence in Latin America. 
Additionally, Panama dropped its recognition of Taiwan and opened a diplomatic 
relationship with China in June 2017, resulting in trade talks between China and Panama 
in 2018.166 In addition to the mega port construction, China Construction America, a state-
owned Chinese company, developed a contract to build the Amador Convention Center 
nearby in 2018.167 The $193 million project includes three separate zones for hosting 
events and is the largest in Central America, carrying the benefit of expanding international 
conventions and tourism, thereby generating income for Panama in addition to the revenue 
from the canal expansion.168 China is potentially at a more significant advantage to 
leverage trade in the region with access and influence on both ends of the canal along with 
the new port facility and other projects in the vicinity of the canal. 
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In addition to port facilities on both sides of the canal, China also developed a plan 
for the Chiriqui-railway overland, a high-speed railway meant to transport people and cargo 
between Panama City and Chiriqui Province along the border of Costa Rica.169 The plan 
developed after a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in November 2017 
when Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela visited Beijing.170 As of 2018, China and 
Panama are conducting a feasibility study for the railway, a project valued at $5.5 billion, 
to be paid by Panama to China.171 Although the agreement is not finalized, the project has 
the potential to further the relationship between Panama and China, provide better transport 
options throughout the country, and give China more considerable influence in Panama as 
China branches out to complete other projects. 
Two other significant developments in Chinese investment within Panama involve 
Shanghai Gorgeous Investment Development and the Martano power generation plant in 
Colón, as well as the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. Shanghai Gorgeous has 
been selected to head the power plant’s expansion to provide power to Panama, beating out 
14 other companies by offering power at a reported 30 percent lower rate than the 
competition, with Chinese investment in the project estimated at $900 million.172 
Additionally, tech giant Huawei has established its regional headquarters in Panama with 
direct investment of over $50 million to include a training center and logistics hub, 
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advertised as generating jobs in Panama.173 China is thus involved in nearly every sector 
of Panama’s economy, ranging from technology, industry, and agriculture to energy and 
trade. 
Bilateral trade has gradually increased in the last 20 years and has the potential to 
receive a boost as the two countries have completed multiple rounds of free trade agreement 
talks since establishing formal diplomatic relations in 2017. A free-trade agreement could 
dramatically increase the amount and scope of trade between the two countries.174 From 
2010 to 2017, Panamanian imports from China steadily increased from $5.65 billion (17% 
of total imports) to $5.96 billion (24% of total imports), while Panamanian exports to China 
increased in dollar amount but decreased in percentage of total exports, going from $26.2 
million (2.4% of total exports) to $56.8 million (1.9% of total exports); China was the top 
source of imports into Panama at $5.96 billion, compared with the United States at number 
two at $4.65 billion of imports into Panama in 2017.175 Dating back to 2000, Panamanian 
imports from China were $725 million (6.8% of total imports) with exports to China at 
$1.8 million (.98% of total exports) compared to the United States as the number one export 
destination, with $337 million (14% of total exports).176 China announced positive 
progress in talks over trade in services and facilitation, investment, legal issues, and 
economic cooperation after it completed the fifth round of free trade negotiations with 
Panama in April 2019.177 The next five to ten years could show significant increases in 
trade between Panama and China if a free trade agreement is finalized. 
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B. SINO-PANAMANIAN SECURITY/MILITARY RELATIONS 
While both Chinese military engagement and influence in the region are rising, 
there is limited information available on Sino-Panamanian military and security relations. 
This absence of data may be explained by Panama’s lack of a formal military force. With 
the ouster of military dictator General Manuel Noriega in 1989, Panama transitioned to a 
civilian-led government, disbanded its armed forces, and created the Panama Public Force 
(PPF), similar to a civilian police force or National Guard.178 Panama is the second country 
in LATAM to demilitarize (1990), following Costa Rica, which demilitarized much earlier 
(1948).179 As of 2019, the Panamanian Public Force comprises the Panama National Police 
(PNP), the National Air-Naval Service (SENAN), and the National Border Service 
(SENAFRONT).180 According to the CIA, “in October 1994, Panama’s National 
Assembly approved a constitutional amendment prohibiting the creation of a standing 
military force but allowing the temporary establishment of special police units to counter 
acts of ‘external aggression.’”181 
While evidence of Sino-Panama security and military relations is not apparent, the 
PPF does engage with nations such as the United States. The United States and Panama 
still participate in the annual PANAMAX exercise (first staged in 2003), meant to ensure 
defense of the Panama Canal. Not only does this exercise promote cooperation between 20 
countries, it also helps protect against threats to the free flow of commerce.182 New 
Horizons is another U.S.-Panama exercise dating back over a decade, focused on 
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humanitarian assistance including civil engineering and medical support services.183 China 
may have tougher inroads with Panama’s Public Force since the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) does not regularly operate in the Western Hemisphere, nor does it have a 
noticeable relationship with the PPF. However, China may have the ability to coordinate 
with the PPF on humanitarian missions with the Peace Ark, on security for the economic 
interests in and around the Panama Canal and FTZ, and on any internal or external security 
threats affecting both Chinese and Panamanian interests. 
C. SINO-PANAMANIAN POLITICAL RELATIONS 
The formal political relationship between China and Panama has seen recent gains 
since Panama established official diplomatic relations with Beijing in 2017 and cut ties 
with Taiwan. As of April 2019, only nine countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) region officially recognize Taiwan.184 The diplomatic relationship between China 
and Panama has quickly provided an inroad for negotiations in several sectors, as “both 
countries are negotiating 19 memoranda of understanding, including agreements to 
enhance their respective industrial, logistics, infrastructure and tourism sectors, among 
others.”185 In addition to the negotiations, China’s leading airline, Air China, has opened 
up direct flights from Beijing to Panama’s capital, which is likely to generate more tourism 
and boost Panama’s economy.186 
China also observes, or is a member of, multiple organizations rooted in LAC to 
which Panama also belongs. China’s involvement in organizations such as the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is likely paying dividends in China’s 
insertion into Panama’s political affairs since Panama is a standing member of the 
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organization.187 As noted by Sullivan and Lum, PRC President Xi Jinping participated in 
a forum with CELAC leaders in 2015, where they agreed to a “five-year cooperation plan 
covering politics, security, trade, investment, finance, infrastructure, energy, resources, 
industry, agriculture, science, and people-to-people exchanges.” This was followed by 
meetings in 2018 to extend the cooperation plan through 2021.188 
As of 2018, 12 LAC countries have signed a variety of BRI agreements, to include 
MOUs, cooperation, or framework agreements.189 Panama was the first LAC country to 
establish a BRI agreement with China.190 China is quickly moving to engage Panama 
despite having such a short “official” diplomatic relationship. In an effort to promote 
tourism and investment, Panama sent a delegation of immigration and security officials to 
China at the end of 2017 as part of an agreement to lift visa restrictions on Chinese visitors 
to Panama.191 Lifting visa restrictions is among several moves Panama and China are 
discussing to boost their political relationship. Xi visited Panama in 2018, just one year 
after the two countries established diplomatic ties in 2017.192 In other efforts, China 
lobbied unsuccessfully to build its new embassy at the entrance of the Panama Canal, a 
pivotal strategic move to assert its influence not only in Panama but in LATAM as a 
whole.193 According to Youkee, despite Panama rejecting China’s request to build its 
embassy at the entrance of the canal, “Xi’s visit comes amid an escalating trade war 
 
187 CELAC is a regional organization combining 33 countries throughout LAC to provide structured 
policy, cooperation, and support of a variety of integrated programs in the region. The organization also 
excludes the United States in the forum. For more information on CELAC, see: “Seguimos Haciendo 
Historia,” Celac International, accessed October 12, 2019, http://celacinternational.org/; Sullivan and Lum, 
“China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.” 
188 Sullivan and Lum, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.” 
189 Rebecca Ray and Kehan Wang, “China-Latin America Economic Bulletin 2019” (Boston 
University, 2019), 1, Global Economic Governance Initiative, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2019/02/GCI-
Bulletin-Final-2019-1-1.pdf. 
190 Koleski, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” 26. 
191 “Panama Lifts Visa Limits for Chinese Visitors,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2017, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2115876/panama-lifts-visa-limits-chinese-
visitors. 
192 Mat Youkee, “Panama the New Flashpoint in China’s Growing Presence in Latin America,” The 




between China and the US, which has highlighted Panama’s strategic importance as a 
pinch-point of world commerce.”194 
Although China is strongly pursuing a political relationship with Panama, a 
timeframe for cooperation regarding a variety of issues is not clear. Specific terms and 
details about the 19–28 reported agreements on a wide variety of issues are largely 
unknown.195 Despite irregularities in reporting on the number of agreements between 
China and Panama, the expansion of the BRI is consistent. Panama’s opening of relations 
with China has given China access to a critical location in the region, which will likely 
allow trade expansion not only with Panama but with the rest of LATAM.196 In 2018, 
President Varela said that trade agreements between Panama and China would promote 
economic growth, which would then assist in social development and benefit the people of 
Panama.197 Other agreements include financial services between the National Bank and 
the Development Bank of China, multiple entry visas, cooperation amongst joint science 
and technology projects, cultural cooperation through industry and the arts, and agreements 
regarding the environment, including water, waste, and air pollution.198 As a relatively 
new relationship develops, China’s diplomatic influence only appears to be increasing. 
D. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS OF CHINESE ACTIONS AND INFLUENCE 
IN PANAMA   
In regards to China and Panama, economic and political interactions are increasing 
since developing diplomatic ties; however, the military and security relationships are not 
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active. On the other hand, China has been a part of Panama’s trade since the turn of the 
century, and that is likely to increase as they finalize a free-trade agreement (FTA). Also, 
the opening of political and diplomatic relations is likely a driving factor for the FTA to 
succeed, even an incentive to boost the relationship. The military and security efforts 
between the PLA and PPF are mostly unknown and appear non-existent, but China may 
try to engage with the PPF as the BRI expands in the region and as China grasps more 
considerable influence around the Panama Canal.  
The economically inspired developmental projects backed by China in Panama 
have been rapidly developing in recent years. Investment has taken priority as Panama 
welcomed China after cutting ties with Taiwan. Additionally, China is becoming a more 
important trade partner with Panama. China also wants to take advantage of the Colón FTZ, 
as it is a platform for Chinese manufactured goods and expanded markets. The Economic 
and Security Review Commission noted in 2016 that China comprised 31.3% of imports 
to Panama, yet less than 1% of exports.199 Analysis of the commission’s statistics reveals 
Panama’s trade with the United States and China is inversely proportionate as the United 
States has a higher percentage of exports (20.6%) and a smaller percentage of imports 
(9.5%) with Panama.200 Although trade between China and Panama is not a new concept, 
their recently established diplomatic developments could mean considerably more 
influence from China with Panama at the free trade zone (FTZ) and in Panama’s domestic 
issues—creating a possible conflict for the United States in the future. Additionally, 
collecting data on bilateral trade negotiations with China has been historically difficult 
since China does not publish many details about its transactions and deals.  
The new political and diplomatic relations may assist China in gaining additional 
influence in Panama as senior officials from both countries have engaged with one another. 
The two countries are already working on an FTA, and Panama has signed on as a BRI 
country. Again, details of the agreements are unknown, but China appears to be engaging 
in a wide variety of other sectors within Panama. Interestingly, one of the agreements is 
 
199 Koleski, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” 25. 
200 Koleski, 25. 
42 
alleged to be geared toward issues involving environmental pollution; however, China is 
plagued with air pollution, which is triggering health issues and threatening its economic 
stability.201 Nonetheless, China is engaging in several sectors and offering money, 
resources, and expertise to cooperate with Panama and continue its efforts at BRI 
expansion. 
Lastly, the military and security relationship are minimal. The absence of a security 
relationship may be because the PPF is not like a modern military and still shares 
engagements with the U.S. military due to exercises such as PANAMAX and the existing 
close relationship of both countries with the Panama Canal. Additionally, the PLAN does 
not regularly operate in the Western Hemisphere, have military experience in the region, 
or have the capacity or means of operating so far from China. Economic interests in Panama 
and at the port facility and FTZ give China an incentive to establish a working relationship 
with the PPF since China is concerned with protecting its economic interests. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has sought to uncover Chinese economic, political, and military 
influence in Africa and Latin America. To this end, it reviewed two case studies of Chinese 
influence: Djibouti and Panama. Based on these investigations, this chapter answers the 
research question: to what extent are the Chinese economic, political, and military 
conditions seen in Djibouti present in Panama. To answer that research question, this 
chapter assesses the hypothesis that China is developing economic and political 
relationships where it sees an opportunity to also deploy its military to protect its economic 
investments. This chapter first provides a comparative analysis of Chinese influence in 
Djibouti and Panama, followed by the findings, and ending with recommendations the 
United States can take to counter Chinese influence in Latin America. Ultimately, China 
does not have the political history or military and security relationships with Panama, and 
therefore, China will not likely put a military base in Panama in the near-term. The United 
States should focus on its military and security relationship with Panama to offset any 
Chinese engagement in Panama so the United States remains a partner of choice for 
Panama.  
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CHINESE INFLUENCE IN DJIBOUTI 
AND PANAMA 
1. Economic Element Analysis 
The two countries have different geography with different people and access to 
different markets and resources. Panama is demographically different from Djibouti, with 
areas of wealth and poverty, yet it has one of the fastest-growing economies in LATAM 
and a population over three times that of Djibouti at approximately 3.8 million as of July 
2018.202 The two countries have a different scale of development, as well, as suggested by 
the Human Development Index (HDI):203 Panama ranks much higher compared to 
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Djibouti, making Panama less dependent on outside investment to boost the standard of 
living for its population. Therefore, Panama is a relatively more prosperous country than 
Djibouti, as noted in chapters II and III. Panama does not depend on Chinese trade and 
investments as it has relations with the world economy and control over trade transiting 
through the canal zone; however, Panama is benefitting from accepting China as an 
economic partner—as evidenced by Panama’s membership into the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and openness to Chinese investment and negotiations for a FTA. China’s 
investment and interest in Panama are directly related to Panama recognizing China over 
Taiwan, a condition that has allowed China to insert itself into Panama’s domestic affairs. 
Therefore, similar Chinese investments occur in both countries—including large 
infrastructure projects paid for and built by China. Djibouti on the other hand widely 
accepts aid from any nation willing to assist it and welcomes outside investment, no matter 
the circumstances. 
Nevertheless, China gains significant economic benefits from each country. China 
is using Djibouti as a transit country to extract resources from the rest of Africa, as well as 
a conduit for readily available maritime trade at the mouth of the BAM. Similarly, in 
Panama, China’s presence in the FTZ and Panama Canal is opening China up to other 
markets for Chinese goods and an FTA with Panama. Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) are present in the negotiation, financing, and construction of infrastructure projects 
in both countries. From a comparative perspective, Chinese influence in both countries 
centers on Chinese investment leading to soft power that enables China to have a presence 
in the country and gives it access to other markets. China is heavily involved in the 
economic sectors in each country and has agreements from both countries to be involved 
in the BRI, opening the door for China to continue to engage economically. From an 
economic standpoint, China is similarly involved in Djibouti and Panama, with 
investments in infrastructure that lead to trade and expanding the maritime silk road 
(MSR). 
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2. Political Element Analysis  
The previous chapters reveal that China’s diplomatic relationship with Panama is 
still in the infant stages compared to the Sino-Djiboutian political relationship, which 
extends back several decades; however, China is making moves that indicate it wants to 
become closer with the Panamanian government. China has been engaging in senior-level 
meetings, port calls, and military exercises with Djibouti for the last 15 years, whereas 
China has only shared senior-level meetings with Panama in the past three years. However, 
this discrepancy is explainable: China’s political relationship with Djibouti developed over 
a long period, supplementing both Djiboutian and Chinese economic interests as well. 
China’s political relationship with Djibouti meshes with its economic interests and with its 
behavior in the East Africa region, especially the maritime environment. China has 
operated its Navy in a political fashion in the waters off the Djiboutian coast in counter-
piracy efforts to support coalitions and act as a regional security partner. As China invests 
more in Djibouti, it has generated soft power that better enables it to influence the 
Djiboutian government. For example, China has invested in Djibouti to extract natural 
resources from other areas, so China has its own economic interests in mind, whereas 
Djibouti wants investment and also desires regional protection from piracy no matter who 
is investing or who is protecting the interests. Currently, China is fulfilling this role. 
Additionally, China has leveraged soft power in its actions toward Djibouti, acting as a 
political and security partner by deploying counter-piracy forces to the region to protect its 
economic interests, which also protect those of Djibouti. Simply put, Djibouti desires a 
political relationship that comes with economic aid, and China has filled the void for the 
time being.  
With respect to politics in Panama, the only thing it currently has in common with 
Djibouti (aside from recognizing Beijing over Taipei) is the senior-level meetings with 
Chinese officials. Xi Jinping has made every effort to engage with Panama diplomatically 
since establishing ties with Panama in 2017. Meeting with Panamanian officials and 
opening direct flights from China are ways China has sought to spark Panama’s tourism 
and open up new markets as the two establish an FTA and China gains more influence 
around the canal zone. As far as port calls and military exercises go, China does not 
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regularly operate in the Western Hemisphere, nor does it have a relationship with Panama’s 
security force, a force that does not operate as a traditional military. All in all, in regards 
to Panama, China is engaging politically where it can fit in, but the military element is 
negligible since the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) does not operate in the region 
or have the capacity to maintain a forward presence. China’s relatively new political 
relationship and lack of military engagement in Panama hinder China’s ability to develop 
an overseas Chinese military base in Panama. 
3. Security and Military Element Analysis 
The two case studies illustrate differences in China’s security and military 
relationship with Djibouti and Panama. China has engaged militarily with Djibouti but acts 
more as a security enforcer rather than interacting directly with the military, whereas China 
does not have any apparent military—or security—relationship with the Panama Public 
Force (PPF). One explanation is that China may not be trying to engage with the PPF, as 
there is not a known relationship or interaction between the PLAN and PPF. The lack of a 
security relationship is explained by Panama demobilizing its military in 1990. 
Additionally, the PPF has an existing relationship with the U.S. military, and both 
participate in the annual PANAMAX exercise, meant to simulate protecting the Panama 
Canal from external forces. Panama’s relationship with the U.S. military is largely rooted 
in the fact that the United States controlled the canal for nearly a century and then passed 
the security role to Panama, but the present relationship emerges from a mutually shared 
economic interest in the canal and the free flow of goods. As Panama now retains full 
responsibility over the canal, it has accepted training from and works with the U.S. military 
so Panama can provide the greatest layer of protection and security over the canal zone. 
Another explanation for China’s absence in Panama is rooted in China’s lack of military 
capacity to operate so far from China’s homeland. China has increased its operating 
distance from China in recent years and now regularly operates beyond the first island 
chain in the western Pacific in addition to operating in vicinity of its port in Djibouti and 
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the IOR.204 However, China’s military does not regularly operate in the Western 
Hemisphere. Despite the PLAN’s achievements in extending operations beyond the East 
and South China Seas, the PLAN does not have the logistical support facilities or 
diplomatic relations in the Western Hemisphere to support continuous operations and 
resupply efforts.  
In Djibouti, the PLAN’s actions are a cross between diplomatic and security 
interactions. As China has injected itself into economic and infrastructure investments in 
Djibouti, it has also deployed its military for two apparent reasons. First, China is out to 
protect its economic interests by having its military present in the region. Second, China is 
acting as a regional partner in supporting counter-piracy operations in the Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden. Given Panama’s relationship with the United States, China may not seek, or could 
have problems in developing a military and security relationship with Panama. The only 
benefit China does have is that it aims to protect its BRI interests, which correlates to a 
defensive posture, something Panama’s security force has in common. 
In sum, Djibouti and Panama are locations of similar geostrategic importance: both 
countries lie at the entrance of a strategic waterway that is critical to global trade and vital 
to China’s BRI expansion. Djibouti resides at the Bab al Mandeb (BAM) strait, where the 
Gulf of Aden connects to the Red Sea, whereas Panama’s territory splits the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans at the Panama Canal. The two countries have economic, political, and 
military and security differences as well, which in turn explain the variances in China’s 
influence in these countries. First, Djibouti is less developed than Panama, so Panama has 
less of a need for the money and resources that China offers, yet there is similar 
infrastructure investment in each country. Second, Djibouti has a past political relationship 
with China lasting several decades, whereas Panama only has political relations lasting less 
than a half-decade, indicating China has more significant influence in Djiboutian affairs 
compared to Panamanian affairs. Lastly, Djibouti has a small military force, mostly relying 
on China and coalition counter-piracy forces to secure its waters, whereas Panama has 
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disbanded its military in favor of a security apparatus that acts more like a national guard 
or police force to protect its citizens and the canal zone, making a Panamanian relationship 
with the PLAN unnecessary. 
These developments explain why Panama may not be the ideal fit for a Chinese 
military base at this time. Despite China not having a security relationship with Panama, 
China’s economic interest in Panama is clear. China is investing in significant 
infrastructure projects in Panama and around the canal zone and is seeking to strengthen 
its relatively new political relationship to gain more influence in the region, specifically 
the Panama Canal. The main element China is lacking in its relationship with Panama is a 
military and security relationship that China can use to protect its economic interests. 
Simply put, China’s lack of military engagement with Panama limits its ability to develop 
a base in Panama. To possibly rectify that issue, China is working on strengthening its 
economic and relatively new political relationship with Panama, which may eventually 
lead to a relationship between the PLAN and PPF. In other words, if China’s military 
develops its capacity to operate far away from China’s mainland and China and Panama 
begin to deepen their economic and political relationships, Panama may accept and work 
with China’s military if it is there to protect shared Sino-Panamanian economic interests.  
B. FINDINGS  
In sum, this thesis found that although Djibouti and Panama both have similar 
Chinese economic influence within their countries, Panama does not have the historical 
political relationship or security associations with China that Djibouti does. China is 
involved with infrastructure projects, trade deals, and supplying financing, labor, and 
supplies in a similar fashion to both Djibouti and Panama. Despite the economic 
similarities in these relationships, China and Djibouti have deeper political ties than China 
has with Panama, which could explain how China was able to develop its first base in 
Djibouti. The governments of China and Panama are working on strengthening their 
political relationship, which may benefit China in the long term. Lastly, and despite the 
military base, the military and security relationship between Chinese and Djiboutian armed 
forces is minor since they do not regularly operate together, but China does play a security 
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role in the region, which they both equally rely on to protect economic interests. China has 
also engaged in port calls and senior-level exchanges with Djibouti. The Sino-Panamanian 
security relationship is widely unknown, but could develop as China develops more BRI- 
related interests in the region and shares economic interests and trade deals with Panama.  
Based on these findings, this thesis concludes that China likely does not have the 
ability to establish a military base in Panama at this time because China lacks a strong 
political and security relationship with Panama. China has explicitly said that its military 
will protect its interests abroad. China has the desire as seen in its explicit interest in the 
Panama Canal region and evidence of its military deployment to Djibouti to protect 
Chinese economic interests in the Africa region, yet it lacks the historical political ties with 
Panama that would otherwise give it sufficient influence to deploy its military to the region 
to protect its BRI interests. China does not have a known security relationship with the 
Panama Public Force (PPF) either, making a security relationship aimed at mutual defense 
of the canal not probable in the near-term. In addition to not having a relationship with the 
PPF, China does not have the capacity to extend its military to the region. The PLAN does 
not regularly operate or port in the area and lacks any logistics or support facilities to 
accommodate forward presence operations in the Western Hemisphere. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO COUNTER 
CHINESE INFLUENCE IN LATAM 
The findings of this thesis recommend that the United States should focus on its 
security and military engagement along with institution building in Panama. Broadly 
speaking, Ellis argues that the United States should focus on aiding partner nations in 
building stronger institutions and promoting democracy to counter Chinese influence in 
Latin America.205 In doing so, LATAM countries can leverage Chinese investment and 
broker deals that are economically beneficial for them so they are not burdened over 
China’s predatory strategies.206 As Ellis asserts, “In the process, the culture of democracy 
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and institutions themselves will be strengthened and engagement with the PRC, rather than 
subverting democracy and regional prosperity, will complement the region’s engagement 
with the United States and other global actors to advance the prosperity of the region.”207 
Additionally, the United States Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) 2019 Posture 
Statement highlights the importance of U.S. partnerships and sharing democratic values to 
ensure security in the region.208 Admiral Craig Faller, USSOUTHCOM’s Commander, 
highlights the importance of U.S. partnerships in the region: “Strong partnerships—
founded in effective and transparent institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, 
institutional capacity building, education, exercises, and presence—are our primary 
bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and are bolstered by our 
work together on military professionalism.”209 Security assistance programs that provide 
education and military equipment to our partners in the region are imperative for 
strengthening partnerships and security.210 
However, in addition to Ellis’ and USSOUTHCOM’s strategy of strengthening 
institutions and democratic governance, rather than competing with China in the sectors 
where is has a foothold, the United States should focus on gaps of Chinese influence to 
remain the partner of choice in the region. In particular, the United States should strengthen 
its existing security and military relationship with Panama. China has engaged Panama 
economically and politically, yet there is little evidence that China has a security 
relationship with Panama. By contrast, the United States shares an economic, political, and 
security relationship with Panama. Given that China is strengthening its economic and 
political ties with Panama and does not have an existing security relationship with the 
Panamanians, to remain a partner of choice with Panama, the U.S. should focus on 
maintaining its economic and political relationships with Panama, while also increasing its 
security assistance and cooperation.  The United States should not be as concerned with 
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diminishing Chinese economic and political influence in Panama, but should focus on the 
security sector. Rather than try to counter all the economic and political moves China is 
making in Panama, the United States should focus its efforts on the Posture Statement of 
Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, and 
strengthening the security relationship. The United States needs to work through 
institutions like the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to advance U.S. 
interests by increasing security assistance to our partners.211 As USSOUTHCOM asserts, 
cooperation can “increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective 
readiness.”212 
In the near term, the United States should increase security assistance and 
cooperation with Panama in order to remain the security partner of choice. The United 
States must continue engaging Panama with an inter-agency approach to build partner 
capacity through increasing Professional Military Education (PME), training in real-world 
operations, and military equipment sales funded by International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs. The United States 
provided approximately $2.2 million in IMET funds to Panama from FY2016–18—not a 
significant amount compared to other U.S. partners in the region.213 Furthermore, and 
despite a common goal of securing trade through the Panama Canal, arms and military 
equipment sales are a sector where U.S.–Panama relations are decreasing. According to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the last arms sales from the 
United States to Panama were Bell-412 helicopters in 2009 and 2012 in addition to a King 
Air-350 ISR aircraft delivered in 2018, while there is no record of arms sales between 
 
211 “DSCA’s mission is to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the 
capacity of foreign security forces to respond to shared challenges. DSCA leads the broader U.S. security 
cooperation enterprise in its efforts to train, educate, advise, and equip foreign partners,” for more 
information on DSCA, see: “Mission, Vision, and Values,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
accessed December 19, 2019, https://www.dsca.mil/about-us/mission-vison-values. 
212 United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “Posture Statement of Admiral Craig S. 
Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command,” 10. 
213 Peter J. Meyer, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2018 
Appropriations, CRS Report No. R45089 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 9, 
2018), 16–21. 
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China and Panama.214 Interestingly, the first Bell-412 helicopter was financed by Taiwan, 
but in 2017, Panama cut ties with Taiwan in favor of political recognition of China.215 
Additionally, a CRS report outlined a 63% decrease in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, 
demining, and related programs (NADR), IMET, and FMF funds from the United States 
to Panama when looking at FY2016–18 foreign assistance requests, which dropped from 
$3.3 million to $1.2 million in funds (FMF requested in FY2018 was zero).216 The 
decrease in funds globally is attributed to the Trump administration’s hard stance on 
providing foreign aid to partner nations, instead favoring budgets to focus on domestic 
issues within the United States.217 Though several forms of U.S. assistance to Panama are 
declining, the relationship between the U.S. and Panama continues and is possible through 
their mutually shared responsibilities and interests at the canal. 
In conjunction with other foreign assistance funding, The United States must also 
continue military- and security-related exercises like PANAMAX and New Horizons to 
enhance and strengthen the security relationship with Panama. The United States should 
increase IMET funding to Panama to educate the PPF in security and U.S. military doctrine. 
IMET has the ability to enhance Panamanian leaders’ understanding of the United States, 
military and security issues, build rapport and future alliances, and increase the PPF’s 
capabilities to work in a combined environment with U.S. forces.218 The United States 
should build partner capacity through training and provisions of equipment before, during, 
and after PANAMAX and other real-world operations to continually engage with the PPF. 
Increased training and working through an exercise together will strengthen U.S.–Panama 
security relations and increase interoperability. It will also build Panama’s capacity to 
operate independently and express its sovereignty over the Panama Canal while enhancing 
 
214 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Trade Registers.” 
215 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Koleski, “China’s Engagement with Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” 25. 
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217 Meyer, 2, 5. 
218 “International Military Education & Training (IMET),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
accessed December 10, 2019, https://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-military-education-training-
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U.S. security interests. Lastly, the United States should increase FMF funds for Panama to 
purchase Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target-acquisition (ISR&T) 
platforms to enhance Panama’s capabilities and effectiveness in combatting internal and 
external threats to its own security and U.S. interests. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analysis of China’s economic, security and military, and political indicators 
seen in Djibouti provide a framework that future research can use as a standard when 
identifying Chinese influence in other countries, including the rest of LATAM. Future 
research can be expanded to provide a more detailed look at indicators and provide one-to-
one comparisons with Djibouti and also comparisons between LATAM countries to 
identify and possibly anticipate where exactly China will put its next overseas base. 
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